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Decolonising Restoration and Justice:
Restoration in Transitional Cultures
MARK FINDLAY
Professor, Centre for Legal Research, Nottingham Trent University and
Associate Professor, Law School, University of Sydney, Australia
Abstract: This article is a strategy for the comparative analysis of justice in various contesting
forms. To identify useful levels of the comparative project, the colonising potential of restorative
justice is examined. In this context the influence of formalised justice mechanisms over the less
formal is explored, with examples in transitional cultures in the South Pacific discussed. Local
and global potentials (and dilemmas) are identified for analysis. The integration of justice
forms, both in terms of structure and ideology, is argued for. Notions of collaborative rather than
restorative justice are advanced, in order that the intersection between state-sponsored and
customary justice forms is best appreciated.
Restorative Justice and Colonisation
Restorative justice may be understood as a new wave of colonialism in the
current domain of social control. When examined against the cultural roots
of certain restorative justice strategies1 this potential to colonise is especially
poignant. Bearing in mind the decimation last century of custom-based
justice in the face of formal, introduced systems, the potential for restorative
justice to overtake modern bureaucratised counterparts particularly in crim-
inal justice, is more than ironic. This article suggests some reasons behind
this trend, and the consequences it poses for interpreting restorative justice.
Constitutional legality and legal formalism were crucial to political and
economic colonialism of the ‘new worlds’ (when introduced law and legal
institutions repressed the impact of custom) (see Findlay 1997a). More
recently, claims for ‘informal justice’2 and its potential to remedy the failings
of bureaucratised crime control have tended to legitimate the capture by
communitarians of juvenile justice in particular. As with the colonisation of
social control through legal and constitutional formalism, restorative justice
has, in some instances, failed to respect the limitations of the models it
promotes, as well as the tensions with the systems it replaces (see Cunneen
1997). The discussion to follow highlights this dislocation.
Colonisation through restorative justice is more complex than the
triumph of the informal over the formal. Claims for restorative justice, and
its mechanisms have led to change in both custom-based and bureaucratised
criminal justice, as the case studies to come suggest. A consequence of these
changes has been that bureaucratised justice is buffered from challenge by
the incorporation and co-option of alternative modes of resolution. Also,
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custom-based control is drawn closer to the command of the state through
recognition and integration.
Advocates of restorative justice argue that less formal justice resolutions
must replace moribund and dysfunctional bureaucratised strategies for
control. Beyond the justification of failure theory (see Cohen 1995) restora-
tive justice is commended as a means for modifying and augmenting pre-
existing control mechanisms. Kathleen Daly (1998) advocates the
exploration of ‘spliced justice forms’. By this, Daly recognises the potential
of collaboration, ‘where an informal, restorative justice process was piggy-
backed on a formal, traditional method of prosecuting and sanctioning seri-
ous offences’ (p.10). In advancing this position, Daly identifies the merits of
an interrelationship between formal and informal justice. She notes Roger
Matthews’s (1988) view that formal and informal justice are neither dichoto-
mous nor a matter of choosing one or the other, but of examining how they
worked together (see Findlay and Zvekic 1988). While this is true, it does
not invite anything but the most sensitive and contextually aware intersec-
tion between justice models with differing features of formalisation.
Experience in transitional cultures, such as those in the South Pacific
(see Findlay 1999, pp.203–17) suggests caution when considering the graft-
ing of a more formal institutionalised mechanism of justice onto pre-exist-
ing, and customary restorative practices. In this respect ‘restorative’ is not so
much the description of an ‘alternative process for resolving disputes’ but
one in which it is both customary and traditional for victims, offenders and
communities to accept responsibility for the resolution of crime-based prob-
lems. Harry Blagg challenges ‘orientalist’ appropriations of culturally
specific reintegration endeavours (see Blagg 1997, 1998). Blagg argues that
the colonisation of customary ceremonies and resolutions may be more
about the securing of the hegemony of introduced systems of justice, rather
than the reassertion and recognition of custom-based alternatives. Scholarly
support for a synthesis of custom and introduced systems may, as Blagg crit-
icises, endorse and confirm Eurocentric ‘devices of destructuring the total-
ity and context’ of customary resolutions.
While justifying Daly’s interest in a synthesis between formal and infor-
mal criminal justice, recent work on the transitional relationships of crime
in a global context (see Findlay 1999, chs. 1, 4) confirms the significance of
Blagg’s injunction. Attempts to ‘splice’ justice forms in certain South Pacific
jurisdictions reveal the danger of cultural abstraction, and the potential to
compromise the essential and potential contextual elements of customary
justice resolution mechanisms.
In order to appreciate the dangers involved in any mindless merging of
justice resolution mechanisms, it is useful to examine these both from local
and more global perspectives. The imperatives and interests behind the
move to integrate may reflect a crisis in local control strategies, as well as
wider claims for legitimacy across control agendas, beyond local, jurisdic-
tional or immediate demands.
A blatant example of the colonising potential of ‘spliced’ justice forms is
demonstrated through reconciliation in the criminal courts of Fiji. This also
provides a local level of analysis for restoration as a justice paradigm.
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Local Levels of Analysis
Section 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1978, of Fiji, provides that
where charges for criminal trespass, common assault, assault occasioning
actual bodily harm, or malicious damage to property are brought under the
Penal Code:
The Court may in such cases which are substantially of a personal or private nature
and which are not aggravated in degree, promote reconciliation and encourage and
facilitate the settlement in an amicable way on terms of payment of compensation or
other terms approved by the Court, and may thereupon order the proceedings to be
staid or terminated.
While having regard to the court’s role as a ‘facilitator’ in the reconciliation
process, this section operates on the understanding that the sanction is in
the hands of the accused. To that extent, the court disposes itself of ‘owner-
ship’ of the penalty beyond its role in promoting settlements of this form.
The state constrains the use of such penalty, or at least limits the situa-
tions in which reconciliation may be recognised by the court, by designating
the offences to which it may relate. This is important in terms of a purpose
for reconciliation; that being the staying or terminating of other penalty
options.
Reconciliation has long existed as a feature of the restitution and
compensation dimensions of customary punishments in the Pacific. Even so,
its punitive potential is recognised in Section 163, through the reference to
‘payment of compensation or any other terms approved by the court’.
Further, by providing for an avoidance of any further state-based penalty by
achieving reconciliation, the institutions of legal formalism have incorpo-
rated this penalty within their own sentencing options.
The operation of reconciliation under the sponsorship of the state courts
differs from ‘self help’, customary resolutions. The consequences of modern
reconciliation as a penalty option within the formal courts are interesting.
In its custom-based context, reconciliation is governed by three factors:
• the public nature of the settlement,
• the collective nature of its terms, and
• the relative expectations of parties involved
In its contemporary context within the formal legal framework of the Fijian
courts it would appear that reconciliation has been removed from an open,
accountable, and relative penalty where the community has an investment,
into a far more private and localised settlement. In Fiji today it is common,
when domestic violence comes before the court, to see reconciliation
promoted as an appropriate penalty. However, between the unequal power
positions of persons negotiating domestic reconciliations, the private nature
of their terms, and the application of expectations which may go well beyond
an immediate issue of the assault or future threats of violence, reconciliation
may become more of an avoidance of penalty rather than a penalty. For
instance, where a complainant withdraws her allegation of assault as a result
of reconciliation, this may be the consequence of threats from the husband
to throw the wife out into the street if she does not ‘reconcile’ rather than
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any genuine rapprochement. The court would not become aware of this by
simply seeking an assurance on reconciliation from the accused, and the
court may not examine the complainant in this regard. The community, the
traditional witness and enforcer of reconciliation also has no voice in the
court hearing.
A key problem with the ‘re-culturising’ of such resolutions or penalties is
the realisation that the state is not the community and vice versa (see Abel
1995). While the state may need to take responsibility (and hence sponsor
criminal justice initiatives) for those crimes which the community should
not own, there exists a significant array of crime situations and crime
choices where community ownership and involvement is appropriate.
However, these situations may not regularly overlap. Therefore, legal
formalism as a feature of the state may not be supportive of customary
penalty. Those features of customary penalty which seem appealing when
compared with the formalised justice structures of introduced law, (such as
openness and accountability) are often compromised or corrupted within
state-centred environments. Further, the essential sanctioning impact of
customary penalties may be lost as they are required to address new aspira-
tions from within the formal justice process.
By identifying the difficulties facing the integration of formalised and
custom-based resolution, it should not be assumed that attempts at such
integration are either fruitless or flawed. In fact, some of the problems asso-
ciated with the intersection of formal and informal justice mechanisms may
have been overcome with the assistance of a more detailed and considered
analysis of the consequences of such integration.
The Indigenisation of Justice
The influence of customary penalty over the control process of formalised
legality means more than the recognition of custom through mitigation, or
acceptance through judicial notice. Across the Pacific the penalties which
now emerge from the state-centred judicial system often incorporate
features of customary penalty. Considering the penalty of banishment, spec-
ulation on the development of ‘hybrid’ and culturally sensitive penalties in
terms of their ownership, object and purpose is possible. In so doing,
Garland’s (1990) emphasis on the cultural essence of penalty is confirmed.
Banishment, an extreme custom sanction in Western Samoa, might
provide an instance where a less formalised control mechanism may be
extrapolated from a uniquely local and relative cultural context into an
application where the level of analysis is potentially global. In this regard,
the more universal potential of the sanction is available for comparative
analysis and cultural transportation only after the original custom context
(and its relationship with the sanction) is appreciated.
Potentially Global Level of Analysis
With banishment, the state in Western Samoa recognises the resilience,
popularity and utility, of community-centred control. It also appreciates the
dangers inherent in a challenge from constitutional legality which will
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expose its peripheral and symbolic presence. Finally, through the tolerance
and even celebration of banishment, the state, and its constitutional legality,
share the legitimacy of indigenised justice forms and outcomes.
In Western Samoa, where today structures of custom-based social order
remain intact, banishment is a powerful penalty available to village commu-
nities. Beyond this both the formalised state-sponsored processes of dispute
resolution, and introduced law have borrowed and endorsed banishment.
The history of banishment as a penalty in Western Samoa was interest-
ingly reviewed in the recent decision of Italia Taamale and Taamale Toelau v.
Attorney General of Western Samoa (Court of Appeal – CA. 2/95B). This was an
appeal from a decision of the Land and Titles Court, a court in the state
judicial hierarchy, ordering the appellants and their children to leave their
village by a nominated date. The appellants argued on appeal that they
could not be in contempt of the original court order through non-compli-
ance because the penalty itself contravened Article 13 (1)(d) and (4), the
freedom of movement and association provisions of the Constitution. They
further argued that it was clear from earlier decisions of the Supreme Court,
the penalty of banishment was not to be recognised by the courts of West-
ern Samoa. It is worthy of note here, that in attempting to defeat the juris-
diction of the custom penalty the appellants not only had recourse to the
courts of introduced law, they also relied on constitutional legality, and colo-
nial law doctrines of precedent.
The tenure of the earlier courts’ argument against banishment as ‘law’
was that ‘ownership’ of the penalty remained within customary tribunals,
directed against traditional relationships and for the purpose of enforcing
customary obligations. None of these therefore should be legitimised at the
level of the state through its legal formalism or constitutional legality.
The appeal court in Taamale rejected such submissions. Banishment was
historically rooted, as the court saw it:
there is no doubt that banishment from the village has long been an established
custom in Western Samoa.
Further, the court went on to review the place of banishment within the law
of the colony, and following on from independence. In 1822 the German
Administration of Western Samoa passed an Ordinance to Control Certain
Samoan Customs. The Ordinance prevented Samoans of any station from
‘expelling any person from his village or district, under penalty of impris-
onment…’. The penalty of banishment was then reserved to the Adminis-
trator.
With the introduction of independent constitutional legality in Western
Samoa, the status of banishment as a penalty became ambiguous in terms of
ownership and objective. The appeal court drew from earlier decisions of
the Supreme Court the view that:
undoubtedly the customs and usages of Samoa in the past acknowledged the rights
of village councils and the court to make banishment orders, but that custom ceased
on 28 October 1960 when the Constitution was adopted.
Several judgments of the Supreme Court in the 1970s and 1980s endorsed
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appeal points that such banishment orders were in violation of the Consti-
tutional rights of freedom of movement and residence.
In Taamale the appeal court acknowledged that currently, for many
village councils in Western Samoa, banishment was the ‘most important
sanction vested by custom in the village council’. Banishment is usually
employed when other forms of customary penalty such as fines and
ostracism from village affairs had failed.
A further argument in favour of the continued significance of banish-
ment was that as an effective general deterrent at a village level, it was rarely
necessary to employ state-centred crime control resources such as the police
to back up the enforcement of customary orders.
The appeal decision recognised the Land and Titles Court as the only
judicial ‘site’ from where banishment as a penalty may emerge:
While upholding the jurisdiction of the Land and Titles Court to order banishment
we do so on the express basis that the jurisdiction can only lawfully be exercised in
accordance with the principles and safeguards identified in the present judgement.
The purpose of the penalty was said to be ‘limited to the interests of public
order – meaning to prevent disturbances, violence or the commission of
offences against the law’. The Land and Titles Court has taken from the
village council the responsibility for the banishment penalty, making it a
formal court order. The councils are left with their ultimate penalty of
ostracising a person within the village.
The appeal court in Taamale endorsed the Court’s assumption of banish-
ment, and the monopoly over this sanction as within its jurisdiction. A justi-
fication as to why banishment moved from the ‘ownership’ of the village
council, to that of a Court is:
that the imposition of a banishment order is made fair and reasonable and accord-
ing to law … An individual who is dissatisfied with a decision given at the first instance
level of the Land and Titles Court also has further (formal) avenues for seeking
redress … as the Land and Titles Court can make a banishment order, so that court
can cancel it.
The process of ‘ownership’ is ‘that a village council minded towards banish-
ment from the village would be well advised to petition that (the Land and
Titles) Court for an order rather than take an extreme course on their own
responsibility’. Further, because serious offences such as murder and rape
are grounds for banishment ‘it is necessary to say that the punishment of
(such) offences is a matter for the criminal courts. Serious crime is properly
dealt with in the Supreme Court’. This appears to be both a further
constraint on the object and purpose of banishment and a limitation over
its ownership.
The court concluded:
Banishment from a village is, at the present time, a reasonable restriction imposed by
existing law, in the interests of public order, on the exercise of the rights of freedom
of movement and residence affirmed (in the Constitution).
Interestingly the court recognised the dynamic and culture-bound nature of
this penalty:
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as Western Samoan society continues to develop the time may come when banish-
ment will no longer be justifiable.
With banishment we have a pre-existing and prevailing custom-based reso-
lution which is ‘indigenised’ by the state and its bureaucratised justice
system. In New Zealand, on the other hand with family group conferencing,
we are witnessing the state claiming cultural sensitivity by adopting the struc-
tures and discourse of Maori justice practice and philosophies. As Tauri
(1998) suggests:
Indigenisation of the justice system … must also refer to the ideological and practi-
cal (re)legitimation of the state’s own system. This is attempted through the imple-
mentation of legislation and justice initiatives that, while appearing on the surface to
empower First Nations, merely incorporates their justice philosophies and practices
within hybridised judicial forms. (pp.177–8)
This is not integrated criminal justice (see Findlay 1999, ch. 6). Nor is it the
victory of one form of control over another. It is a process of colonisation,
where bureaucratised justice claims legitimacy through assimilation. The
integration of justice resolutions requires more than the transaction of
benefits and interests, one context to another. The integrity of the original
context needs to be retained along with the credibility of any new applica-
tion (and its context) for integration rather than colonisation to take place.
Integration of Justice Forms
The discussion of criminal justice relocated from the context of custom into
formalised criminal justice institutions highlights several problems for inte-
gration:
• the structures of sanction on which crime control traditionally lies may be
culturally specific
• the structures of community out of which such sanctions emerge may not
be compatible with the ‘communities’ of modernisation
• the delineations between control, tolerance and reintegration in
modernised communities may be hard and fast – in custom settings these
may more naturally merge, as the behaviours and situations they regulate
are not so rigidly labelled
• the interests regulated for in modernised societies are more individual
and therefore require more formalised legal protection
• the bureaucracies which construct modernised criminal justice have a
large investment in crime control – as such they are reluctant to divest
their areas of responsibility in favour of other socialisers
• the state represents the interests of those affected by crime in modernised
criminal justice – therefore, the community consensus and co-option so
essential for tolerance and reintegration (and evident in the custom
contexts) are removed from more formalised crime control
Within modernised communities these difficulties necessitate either artifi-
cial or imposed integration in place of a natural and evolutionary integra-
tive context for control. One reason for this is the manner in which
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modernisation, and its institutions, has tended to colonise (and often
compromise) pre-existing ways of doing things. Custom-based justice reso-
lutions are just one casualty of this process. What is interesting recently,
however, has been the manner in which derivations of custom have made
claim for levels of justice resolution where bureaucratised alternatives are
either ineffective or losing credibility. In this regard moves towards integra-
tion are not simply from the informal to the formal, custom to modern.
The forces favouring integration will encounter resistance from localised
control regimes, where sophisticated bureaucracies monopolise the institu-
tions and processes of crime control. As much as crime is differentiated
from other behaviours and situations needing regulation, crime control in
these localised contexts is institutionally separate from the broader themes
of socialisation.
Despite certain representations of globalised crime which suggest a
return to the modes of denunciation common in simpler societies, the pref-
erence for adapting and advancing modernised crime control strategies is a
feature of global politics. This paradox cannot be explained in terms of a
common language of criminal liability, local to global. Globalised crime
offends morality, polity and perpetuity rather than the interests of individu-
als. Victimisation is collectivised. Harm is global. Threats are common. As
such, the context of globalised crime seems to be communal, and control
arguably should be integrated in order to address a collectivised problem.
To test this suggestion, the transportation of a custom-based control tech-
nique into a globalised context may indicate the applicability of integrated
control for regulating global crime. Banishment is a control strategy with
roots deep in customary socialisation. It depends on consensus, approba-
tion, comprehensive ascription, and total enforcement. Banishment is
reliant on community and not state sanction. It grows out of stages of toler-
ance, and failed situations of reintegration.
A global crime context where banishment would be relevant is corporate
crime. For the individual, bankruptcy is a banishment from the market-
place. For the corporation ‘winding up’ proceedings may have some regu-
latory impact but this is limited to where the company against which these
are directed is simply an expendable part of a wider corporate entity.
Commentators on corporate regulation favour control initiatives which
recognise the significance of compliance (Fisse and Braithwaite 1988). But
what happens when compliance evaporates or breaks down?
Banishment means exclusion from the community. Essential for its puni-
tive and regulatory significance is separation from those features of commu-
nity life valued by the banished. The community is more than a referent in
that it must maintain the boundaries of exclusion. For instance, interna-
tional trade sanctions imposed by one nation on another will not have the
same impact without multinational endorsement.
Some might see banishment as anything but an integrated control strat-
egy. It appears to depend on segregation and difference. What makes banish-
ment integrative, however, is the manner in which it involves the whole
community and a range of socialisation beyond crime control. In addition,
banishment is a transitional state, usually imposed for a determinate period,
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with the exception that it will create a radical context for reintegration when
its time has run.
Banishment’s influence within a corporate commercial community
would depend on the authority prescribing this penalty. Once the banish-
ment order was determined, the community would be required to achieve
the banishment from a series of nominated and valued relationships. These
might involve market position, consumer confidence, capital access, and
share trading. A schedule for reintegration might be set as part of the
banishment strategy.
This mechanism will be far better suited to the corporate entity than
individualised penalties such as the fine, or imprisonment. Banishment
requires and incorporates responsibilities advocated by the corporate
community in its arguments for self-regulation. It has a reintegrative goal,
while adopting clearly retributive and deterrent measures in its early stages.
The feature on which the effectiveness of an integrated (local to global)
control strategy relies is the scope of community collaboration for its
achievement. Collaboration in simple, local communities is obvious and
essential to the context of the sanction in question. The restorative conse-
quence of its application is ensured through the commitment of the
community and the collaboration between the perpetrator, victim and their
immediate community. On a global level collaboration is equally essential
but more difficult to realise and retain. This is not just a product of a more
complex community context. It is a consequence of confusion over respon-
sibility to collaborate, and the state to which the offender and the victim
must be restored.
Conclusion: Collaboration Rather than Restoration?
It is necessary to examine in more detail the issue of collaboration and its
crucial connection with restoration prior to anticipating the successful inte-
gration of justice mechanisms at various levels of formalisation. By focusing
on harmonisation and collaboration as features of the essential context
within which certain less-formalised justice resolutions tend to prevail might
be more productive than tending to focus on their restorative outcomes. An
outcome-driven analysis has the danger of overlooking the possibility of
disharmony and domination inherent in the preference for restorative
justice.
A re-thinking of the notion of ‘restorative justice’ may facilitate efforts at
harmony. In recent justice parlance restorative justice refers to:
an alternative process for resolving disputes in organisations, to alternative sanction-
ing options, or to distinctly different new modes of criminal/juvenile justice organ-
ised around principles of restoration to victims, offenders, and the communities in
which they live. (Daly 1998, p.5)
Another way of looking at restoration here is to focus on the process rather
than on the participants and the outcome. This will necessarily then require
an exploration of traditional or custom-based mechanisms for resolution,
mechanisms which have a particular cultural resonance worthy of recogni-
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tion and protection. In any such consideration, we would be answering
Harry Blagg’s (1998) question: what is being restored in restorative justice?
(p.8). Blagg’s argument away from restoring to the status quo, where this is
both ‘incomplete and one-dimensional’, has some significance for any
reflection on the restoration process of custom based resolution. Only when
the full cultural context of such resolutions operating within a contempo-
rary world is considered, will restoration of a status quo be dynamic and
transformational. Further, the recognition of context, both initial and trans-
formed, when examining restorative justice mechanisms will automatically
highlight the situations and stages where community collaboration is possi-
ble or denied.
A new interpretation of restorative justice, (that is, restoring culturally
sensitive custom-based resolutions within and beyond their original
context), is possible though recognising the essential significance of collab-
oration, in any context of its application. More than simply an expectation
that alternative, less formalised strategies will likely be restorative, collabo-
rative justice claims that the effective delivery of criminal justice must be
both culturally relative and reliant on community co-operation. Even so,
certain common themes will tend to invigorate the relevance and impact of
particular criminal justice initiatives. In this respect the ‘collaboration’ in
justice is not simply an expectation for local communities, but between
proponents of custom-based resolution, and those with investments in the
rejuvenation of more formalised criminal justice regimes. Collaborative
justice relies on an integrative model for criminal justice delivery in transi-
tional cultures, where the state values customary resolutions and the
community accepts the state’s responsibilities in the area (Findlay 1999, ch.
7). Essential to such recognition and acceptance is a programme of educa-
tion and training in which principal participants would be involved. These
participants may include victims and their immediate community, perpetra-
tors, police, community agencies, sentencers, and elders. They need initially
to be made aware of their mutual interests and potential contributions prior
to being invited to explore and apply interactive models for justice delivery.
In societies where state-sponsored justice is weak and customary resolu-
tion is widespread or recognised, (such as those in our examples from the
South Pacific) the most efficient way in which the legitimate goals of crimi-
nal justice are to be achieved is through collaborative models and initiatives.
However, in order that collaboration is to emerge and be sustained in a
climate of co-operation and ownership, the principal participants in crimi-
nal justice must be brought together to identify their expectations for justice
resolutions and determine the most effective response to these expectations.
To facilitate collaboration beyond the initial customary context (such as
at a global level), participants and stakeholders in the justice process should
be provided with collaborative justice models which have been successfully
tested in other settings. These must exhibit elements compatible with the
characteristics of the ‘new communities’ in which collaboration is offered
(that is, the mutual obligations which bind multi-national corporate enter-
prise, as compared with homogeneous village organisation, in the case of
banishment). The crude transplantation of culturally specific models into
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alien settings is neither collaborative nor potentially successful. Rather,
collaborative justice models in a context where custom and introduced law
intersect, allow for the critical adaptation of effective models of resolution,
encouraging original or new participants to own, implement and sustain
collaborative justice initiatives which emerge in such an exercise.
Collaborative justice will also ensure custom-based initiatives, presently
endangered by the colonisation of introduced law and systems enhance
their sustainability through appropriate integration within competing
systems. This process of integration, being essentially collaborative and
community based offers a responsive and relevant alternative to the dissec-
tion and co-option of some restorative justice agendas.
The essence of collaboration for the success of restorative justice initia-
tives also explains the recent predominance of restorative over bureaucra-
tised justice forms. Further, effective community collaboration distinguishes
those justice resolutions which ‘work’, along with those that survive trans-
plantation from one cultural context or level, to another.
Returning to the crucial determinant of any comparative policy agenda
for justice resolutions, before one can declare a preference for any justice
paradigm, or critique the cultural reality of restorative justice, comparative
contextual analysis must be engaged in. This is particularly imperative when
the local/global dichotomy is addressed as crucial for any understanding of
contemporary justice paradigms. Therefore, the comparative project and its
pitfalls underlie all that has been discussed so far.
The Comparative Project: A Research Aside
Recently, when examining the relationship between crime and globalisation
(Findlay 1999), we argued the virtues of comparative contextual analysis.
This means an interactive project where context is employed over community
or culture, to enable comparative analysis without sacrificing specificity.
Comparative contextual analysis provides the potential to reconcile ‘an
acute sensitivity to the peculiarities of the local’, with ‘the universalising
imperative’. The novelty in this approach to comparative analysis is not the
rediscovery of context. Rather it is in the multi-levelled applications which
context invites:
To achieve its fullest potential … comparative research should, therefore, concen-
trate within a nominated cultural context; across two or more contexts within the
same culture; across time and space within a culture in transition; culture to culture;
and (or not) simultaneously at the local and global levels. (Findlay 1999, p.vii)
Nelken (1997) identifies the need to ensure, when analysing any feature of
criminal justice, that it ‘resonates’ with the rest of the culture in context
before a comparison is advanced:
Cultural ideals and values of criminal justice do not necessarily reflect their wider
diffusion in the culture. In many societies there is a wide gulf between legal and
general culture, as where the criminal law purports to maintain principles of imper-
sonal equality before the law in societies where clientilistic and other particular prac-
tices are widespread. (p.563; also Findlay 1997b)
408
ª Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2000
Howard Journal 39.4  27/10/00 10:27 am  Page 408
The recognition of difference is crucial to the success of comparative
contextual analysis. So too is there potential through comparison, to under-
stand the complexity of culture and not only seek explanations for features
of culture, such as crime:
Comparative investigation turns into the hermeneutic exercise of trying to use
evidence about crime and its control to resolve puzzles about culture. (Nelken 1994,
p.225)
Comparative contextual analysis should not be bound by dichotomous
methodologies, (see Sztompka 1990) or divergent outcomes (see Beirne
1983). Its focus on interaction within contexts, opens up to understanding
dynamic relationships such as crime and control, and trends in these. The
perennial problem of comparing like with like or a common concept within
different contexts is surpassed when the analysis is of interaction and transi-
tion. Further, the concerns for comparison in terms of motivation or expec-
tation are less likely to be discussed as stark dichotomies if the analysis
unfolds through various levels and dimensions.
Comparative contextual analysis does not focus on the boundaries of
crime and control in order to seek their explanation. It is more likely to
explore the relationships within these boundaries, and the manner in which
new or transitional contexts impact on and transform these relationships.
An enlivening, if underdeveloped capacity of comparative analysis is to
move away from ‘cause and effect’ as a narrow frame of analytical reference.
When examining institutions and strategies of crime control, a causal focus
tends both to distort the place and purpose of criminal justice, as well as the
motivations for the analytical project. Comparative contextual analysis
recognises the possibility of simultaneously viewing crime and control from
several dimensions, as ‘multiple, overlapping and interconnecting socio-
spatial connections of power’ (Mann 1986, p.1). This emphasis on interac-
tion and transition avoids simplistic assumptions about criminal justice, and
the unfounded construction of policy. It should also prevent the abstraction
of effective social control mechanisms from their essential contextual
supports, to the extent where an appreciation of the impact of context over
control is lost.
An example of this is the examination of restorative justice mechanisms
from the culture out of which they emerge, then the introduced culture into
which they are adapted, and finally in the context of their representation. As
instanced above, however, it is necessary to dispel the impediments to this
analysis by exposing some of the interests which advance more limited
approaches to comparative analysis (for example, where one form of justice
seeks its legitimacy from the other, or its validation from the other’s failure).
Restorative justice as a focus for comparative cultural analysis has regu-
larly suffered from what David Nelken (1997) refers to as ‘comparison by
juxtaposition’. This may be explained through answers to Nelken’s question
about what the comparison is supposed to be achieving. Particularly in the
literature supporting the policy of conferencing, the relentless reference
back to methods and experiments in a specific cultural context so as to justify
their adoption and promotion in others, exposes comparative analysis to crit-
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icisms for which it should not be held responsible. Rather than the style of
analysis, it might be ‘the disguised hegemonic project and the avowed
research for global legal concepts’ (Zedner 1995, p.519), which is laid open
to criticism.
The inclusion of comparative analysis amongst the characteristics of intel-
lectual and administrative imperialism is only to be expected when contex-
tual actuality is overlooked or under-played. Where the comparative project
breaks down into an exercise in justification rather than analysis is when
context is marginalised. Therefore, the insights into restorative justice, for
instance, offered by comparative analysis are no longer sufficiently critical or
analytical, unless they recognise levels of cultural context and transition.
Whether one wishes to:
• analyse the impact of restorative justice
• evaluate the transition of restorative mechanism from their original to
their transplanted cultural contexts
• review the influence of restorative over bureaucratised justice resolutions,
or
• speculate on why restorative justice is successfully colonising domains
once held by bureaucratised justice processes and institutions,
the comparative challenge is clear. If, as this article invites, collaboration is
conceded as a crucial characteristic of the restorative justice context, the
nature of that collaboration within and between the original and trans-
planted community requires critical review. Such a review, to avoid
contributing to little more than dogma or policy imperialism, can only
proceed if immersed in the context of its origins and its cultural translation.
Notes
1 Such as conferencing and Maori culture, reconciliation and Fijian custom, and
sentencing circles and First Nation peoples in Canada.
2 We are not comfortable with the suggestion of simple dichotomies between the
mechanisms of justice based on degrees of formalism. It is better to see formalism
as a continuum when analysing justice mechanisms (see Findlay and Zvekic 1988).
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